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ABSTRACT
Unrecognizedand deferred losses at insured deposit institutionscurrently
impair the capacity of the nation's principal deposit insurers(the FDIC and FSLIC)
both to discipline failing institutions andto discipline or take over insolvent ones.
These agencies' accrued but unreported losses farexceed their explicit financial
resources. Moreover, their backlog of unresolvedproblem cases far exceeds the
workload that their existing staffs can handle.
What holds the deposit-institutionsystem together is financial-market partic-
ipants' so-far-unshakable faith that politicians and bureaucratscannot afford to let
the FDIC and FSLIC renege on theobligations that they and their predecessors
have permitted these agencies to assume.Underlying this belief is a conjectural
economic assessment of the strength andconstancy of incentives that direct
elected politicians to bail out politically sensitiveenterprises.
This paper addresses three tasks: (I) toclarify the defects in the informa-
tion, monitoring, regulatory-response, and incentivesub-systems of federal deposit
insurance that, by subsidizing institutionalrisk-taking, led so many deposit
institutions and their insurers into economicinsolvency; (2) to identify a generic
mix of reforms that could in principleput the system right again; and (3) to explain
how far proposals for reform that holda place on the active legislative and





Columbus, Ohio 43210NO ROOMFOR WEAK LINKSIN THE CHAIN OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE REFORM
Edward 3. Kane*
I. Introduction and Summary
Afterdecades of successful operation, perverse risk-bearing incentives
established by the federal deposit-insurance system threaten to engendera painful
and expensive bureaucratic breakdown. This breakdown is foreshadowed instate-
level insurance-fund insolvencies experienced by Mississippi in 1976, by Nebraska in
1983, and by Ohio and Maryland in 1985. This paper stresses that the problem
traces not just to inadequacies in FDIC and FSLIC premium structures, butmore
importantly to weaknesses in insurance agencies' policies and procedures for
preventing, detecting, and resolving client insolvencies.
Deposit institutions officially fail when their chartering agency either closes
them down or merges them out of existence. An unofficial failure occurs when the
government takes direct or indirect control of a troubled firm. In the prototypical
case, a failing deposit institution undergoes a gradual and time-consuming decline.
As its financial condition deteriorates, government examiners give the firma
progressively lower rating in periodic examinations. When this rating becomes low
enough, the firm is officially labeled a "problem institution" and subjected tovery
close regulatory supervision. This supervision, which is sometimesaccompanied by
subsidized federal loans or commitments, is meant to help the weakened firm
control its losses and rebuild its capital accounts.
*The author is Everett D. Reese Professor of Banking and Monetary Economics and
Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research.This research
benefitted from the financial support of the National Center on Financial Services
of the University of California, Berkeley and from detailed comments byGeorge
Benston and Paul Horvitz. Opinions expressed are the author's alone and should not
be construed to represent those of NBER.2
In an average year during the 1970s, 8 banks and 4 S&Ls failed and officials
classified fewer than 2 percent of existing banks as problem institutions. During
the 1980s, official and unofficial failures and problem cases surged dramatically.
Beginning in 1985, de facto failure rates have averaged 2.5 per week for banks and
1.5 per week for S&Ls. Currently, more than 10 percent of U.S. commercial banks
and 20 percent of S&Ls are regarded as problem institutions.
Unfortunately, deterioration in the profitability and net worth of deposit
institutions and federal deposit insurers is even more acute than official figures
indicate. Accounting gimmickry and forms of regulatory forbearance that deposit-
institution supervisors routinely extend to many types of basket-case firms create
or preserve fictitious profits and capital that today enable hundreds of financial
institutions to operate in an economically insolvent or "zombie" state.
Unrecognized and deferred losses at insured deposit institutions currently
impair the capacity of the nation's principal deposit insurers (the FDIC and FSLIC)
both to discipline failing institutions and to discipline or take over insolvent ones.
These agencies' accrued but unreported losses far exceed their explicit financial
resources. Moreover, their backlog of unresolved problem cases far exceeds the
workload that their existing staffs can handle. These financial and personnel
shortages make it hard for the FDIC and FSLIC together to sustain a failure rate of
more than four or five institutions per week.
On average over recent business cycles, defects in the deposit-insurance
system are creating new problems for the FDIC and FSLIC faster than agency
officials can resolve existing ones.With existing problems greatly exceeding
explicit agency reserves, the continued credibility of FDIC and FSLIC financial
promises is now conditioned more tightly on the outcomes of supporting political
processes than on these agencies' innate financial strength. What holds the
deposit-institution system together is financial-market participants' so-far-unshak-3
able faith that politicians and bureaucrats cannot afford to let the FDIC and FSLIC
renege on the obligations that they and their predecessors have permitted these
agencies to assume. Underlying this belief is a conjectural economic assessment of
the strength and constancy of incentives that direct elected politicians to bail out
politically sensitive enterprises.
Because it is not clear how long this assessment may be taken as given, this
paper attempts three tasks. The first task is to clarify the defects in the
information, monitoring, regulatory-response, and incentive sub-systems of federal
deposit insurance that, by subsidizing institutional risk-taking, have brought so
many deposit institutions and their insurers to their current sorry state. The
second task is to identify a mix of minimally disruptiv'e reforms that could in
principle put the system right again. Finally, the third task is to explain how far
proposals for reform that hold a place on the active legislative and regulatory
agenda fall short of this ideal.
II. Conceptual Foundations of Deposit Insurance
To stop the deposit institution industry's continuing slide into financial
insolvency, we need to shore up the foundations of the deposit-insurance system.
These foundations differ fundamentally from the impression created by the
statutory language on which the system is built. The de facto operation of federal
deposit insurance differs radically from what its de jure features suggest.
Viewed as a generic financial contract, deposit insurance may be said to give
"beneficiaries" a collection of "insurance services" in exchange for cash
"premiums" disbursed by "paying customers." These insurance services are limited
as to "coverage" and backed in combination by each insurer's cash "reserves" and
"risk-rn anagernent" and "loss-resolution" systems. Anomalously, in deposit-insur-
ance contracts, each of the quoted characteristics diverges essentially from the
meaning that an unsophisticated taxpayer would assign to them.4
WhoPays? Who Benefits?
The first irregularity is that the identity of de facto beneficiaries and paying
customers are the reverse of the de jure ones. On the surface, deposit institutions
pay their insurer a series of explicit premiumsand make depositors the benefi-
ciaries of the contract. At both agencies, the basic premium (which is subject to
additional adjustment) is 1/12 of one percent per year for every dollar of assessable
deposits.' However, the immediate benefits of the contract consist of reduced
funding costs for institutions whose deposits are insured. FDICand FSLIC
guarantees permit insured firms to borrow at approximately Treasuryyields to
support a portfolio of risky assets that, in the absence of federal guarantees,they
could finance only by paying a much higher interest rate. Moreover, explicit
premiums constitute only a small portion of the total cost of keepingFDIC and
FSLIC guarantees credible and most of these costs are borne ultimately by the
taxpayerat large.
As illustrated in 1985 by the FDIC's suspension of premium rebates and by the
FSLIC'sintroduction of a supplementary quarterly premium of 1/32of one percent,
depositinstitutions may be viewed as the taxpayers of first resort. As long as the
need for additional reserves remains modest, supplementary premiums fall proxi-
mately on deposit institutions' capital. However, stockholders of assessed institu-
tions need not shoulder this taxlike burden permanently. In competitive markets,
regulatory burdens and taxes tend in large part to be shifted into the prices afirm
offers its customers and the wages it pays its employees. Hence, supplementary
premiums tend to tighten contract terms offered to depositors, borrowers,and
deposit-institution employees. As ultimate payers for user charges and asthe deep
'Besides insured deposits an institution's assessable deposit base includes most
forms of its formally uninsured domestic deposits.5
pocketthat backsupunderfundedagency guarantees, nonstockholder Citizens bear
mostof theCostsof federal deposit insurance.
The heart of the underlying incentive problem is that taxpayers and politi-
cians monitor the performance of federal deposit-insurance agencies in an un-
balanced fashion. They are far more sensitive to de jure failures and de jure
insurer outlays than they are to de facto ones. A de facto failure is best defined as
a regulator-induced cessation of an institution's autonomous operations. A de jure
failure occurs when the institution's charter is formally cancelled and/or trans-
ferred away from its Current owners or managers by supervisory directive. When
an institution's charter is cancelled, its accounts are thrown into some form of
receivership. For this to occur, its chartering authority must render a prior finding
of insolvency.
In a dictionary sense, an insolvent institution is one that has lost the capacity
to discharge its liabilities. This capacity may be lost because of either illiquidity
or economic solvency. A shortage of liquidity may render an institution with
positive net assets temporarily unable to pay off its liabilities as they come due.
However, as lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve is supposed to prevent mere
liquidity shortgages from shutting down a deposit institution. Hence, the theo-
retically more relevant reason is the second one. In this case, the lack of capacity
flows from the firm's entire balance sheet. It occurs when the value of the firm's
assets falls below the value of its nonequity liabilities, so that the firm has
"negative net worth."
The FDIC and FSLIC officially lose money in a client failure only when they
absorb a former client's negative net-worth position into their own accounts.
Because agency managers routinely resort to accounting gimmickry to disguise
their true losses, it is necessary to distinguish also between insurers' de jure and de
facto losses. A de facto loss occurs whenever the market value of an asset falls or6
that of a liability (such as an insurer's unbooked guarantee of client debt) increases.
However, a de jure loss occurs only when and if FDIC and FSLIC choose to book a
loss. FDIC and FSLIC discretion in booking losses is of course de facto rather than
de jure. De jure, particular conditions can require agency accountants to recognize
an incipient loss. However, agency managers prototypically tailor their responses
to client insolvencies and deterioration in agency-owned assets to prevent undesir-
able requirements from taking hold.
Permitting agency personnel to conceal de facto economic insolvencies
existing in the accounts not only of client institutions but also of their own agency
permits them to mask accompanying deterioration in the contingent liabilities
imposed on federal taxpayers. To protect taxpayers' interests, policymakers must
be required to focus on the net market value of assets and liabilities. This market
value is the criterion a private guarantor would use. In workout situations, this
value serves as the fulcrum around which troubled private loans are restructured.
It is not sufficient for federal insurers to employ definitions of institutional
insolvency that turn on traditional accounting measures of net worth or liquidity.
The readings these definitions generate may be consciously or unconsciously
manipulated by bureaucrats and/or failing institutions in ways that serve these
parties' particular ends at the expense of unwary and unguarded federal taxpayers.
The short-term liquidity of a troubled institution is often entirely in the
hands of the Federal Reserve and Federal Home Loan Banks. As long as federal
entities make and renew loans to an illiquid institution, the institution's managers
can service current depositor claims. On the other hand, refusal to make or renew
loans can force an illiquid but economically solvent institution into legal insolv-
ency.
Accounting net worth is an inappropriate criterion because the book values at
which accountants carry individual assets and liabilities are generally based on past7
acquisition costs. This approach to valuation permits an institution to increase its
accounting net worth by selling assets on which it has unrealized gains in the form
of post-acquisition price appreciation, while ignoring post-acquisition price
declines and other forms of unbooked losses.
Premiums versus Costs
Deposit-insurance costs consist of expenses incurred to control and to reserve
for the losses that the guarantor must reasonably expect to experience. Because
federal guarantees are underpriced and explicit agency reserves are relatively
small, the workability of the system depends on the effectiveness of constraints
that insurers impose on insured institutions in hopes of keeping their risk-taking
within acceptable levels. Hence, in addition to the opportunity costs of maintain-
ing an insurance fund, deposit-insurance costs include expense engendered by
monitoring and supervisory activity undertaken by insurers. They also include
deposit institutions' explicit and implicit costs of complying with agency require-
ments. From a client's point of view, compliance costs constitute implicit
insurance premiums. To calculate a firm's total premium, these implicit premiums
must be added to explicit or cash premiums.
Because explicit premiums are subject to rebates and supplementary assess-
ments, it is useful to distinguish between ex ante premiums (those paid in advance)
and schemes of compensation that provide for an ex post (i.e., after the fact)
settlement of claims actually brought against the insurer. Ex post assessments
could be targeted much more selectively than they are now. One approach would
be to require federally insured deposit institutions to be stockholder-owned and to
extend the limited liability of individual deposit-institution stockholders to a
multiple of the par value of their shares. Since mutual deposit institutions have
been voluntarily converting to stockholder form at a rapid rate during the mid-
1980s, the first part of this requirement is probably becoming less burdensome day8
by day. In the event an institution were to become insolvent, the second provision
would make its stockholders personally liable for additional assessments. Extend-.
ing stockholder liability would have the advantage of reducing the basic asymmetry
in the distribution of the firm's gains and losses between stockholders and deposit
insurers. To assure stockholders' willingness and ability to meet these assessments,
personal and corporate deposit-institution stockholders could be required to bond
their potential liability by placing a sufficiently valuable block of individually
owned earning assets in escrow with the deposit institution or some other agent for
the insurer. As with margin accounts that guarantee performance in futures
trading, the total market value of escrowed assets would be what mattered, not
their particular composition. Whenever a stockholder wanted to sell an escrowed
asset, he would be free to replace that asset with another of like value.
Under existing arrangements, deposit insurers have the right to require
stockholders of a troubled deposit institution to contribute additional capital.
However, this right (or covenant) loses force as a firm becomes economically
insolvent.As a firm's stockholder-contributed capital declines below zero,
stockholders lose interest in paying a fee to stop the insurer from taking over the
institution. This makes the timing of an insurer's call for additional capital the key
to its enforceability. From this perspective, extending stockholder liability may be
seen as a way to overcome bureaucratic lags in insurers' monitoring and response
subsystems.It would reduce the criticality to insurers of recognizing and
responding rapidly to a sudden deterioration in a client's economic condition.
To explore the burdensomeness of extending stockholder liability in this way,
extended liability could be introduced as an optional way of meeting traditional
capital requirements. Authorities could offer a lower requirement on paid-in
capital for firms whose stock carries the prescribed form of direct call on
stockholder assets.If capital requirements are to be increased, establishing9
flexibility in the ways that requirements can be met could prevent stiffer
requirements from placing undue burdens on conservatively run firms. In small,
closely held firms, stockholders can make sure that managers follow policies that
keep the value of the call extremely small. At the same time, the insurer would be
protected against sudden changes in a client's risk exposure over which it has no
control.
Insurance Contract versus a Financial Guarantee
The existence of conjectural taxpayer backup and agency risk-management
opportunities are two ways in which the term "insurance" misrepresents the nature
of FDIC and FSLIC commitments. However, the most important difference is that
these agencies' support is unconditional, and therefore not subject to actuarial
analysis of the frequency with which specific contingencies have occurred in the
past. True insurance contracts always designate a set of specific hazards against
which coverage is written and a set of specific exceptions (e.g., wars or acts of
God) against whose effects coverage does not apply.
Deposit-insurance contracts are financial guarantees. They place the credit
of the FDIC and FSLIC behind that of their clients. A rational guarantor must
establish and operate a risk-management system designed to control its risk
exposure. Because FDIC and FSLIC guarantees apply irrespective of why an
institution becomes unable to service its debts, their value is tied to the quality of
these agencies' information, monitoring and response subsystems. The value of the
guarantor's risk exposure in any firm can be defined as the difference between the
capitalized value of the projected Costs of monitoring and supervising clients and
of resolving insolvencies (these costs are jointly determined since the insolvency
rate per unit time is conditional on the effectiveness of the guarantor's risk-
management system) less the capitalized value of client premiums. It is important
to recognize that administrative opportunities exist for the guarantor to limit its10
losses by closing a client or taking over its operations before losses develop. This
implies that the risk of not being able in timely fashion to exercisetheir options to
close or take over failing firms is the major risk facing the FDIC and FSUC. The
existence of this risk explains the economic need for these agencies to establish
appropriate information, monitoring, and supervisory (i.e., regulatory-response)
subsystems to control this risk at minimum cost.
Active risk management is required because a fundamental asymmetry exists
between the client's and the guarantor's claims to institution's unanticipated profits
and losses.The degree of this asymmetry depends on the adequacy of the
guarantor's information, monitoring, and response subsystems and on the relative
financial strength of the guarantor and the client (i.e., each party's respective net
worths and exposures to risk).
Implicit versus Explicit Insurance Reserves
Conjectural taxpayer backup gives insurers implicit reserves that far exceed
their explicit reserve funds. Arrangements for closing holes that develop in FDIC
or FSLIC balance sheets are incomplete. However, considerable evidence attests
to the strength of incentives disposing elected politicians to bail out federal
deposit-insurance agencies. First, Congress has permitted the FDIC and FSLIC to
rely on the failing-firm doctrine to supplement their reserves by selling acquirers
of failing firm exemptions from antitrust restrictions and from regulations against
interstate and cross-industry operations. The failing-firm doctrine has been sorely
stretched in the case of so-called phoenix S&Ls (which represent combinations of
failing firms in nearby localities) and in a Federal ome Loan Bank Board proposal
to grant multiyear exemptions from unfriendly takeovers to acquirers of insolvent
S&Ls. Second, each agency owns a statutorily limited line of credit with the U.S.
Treasury. Third, in March 1982 a 3oint Congressional Resolution put the "full faith
and credit" of the U.S. Treasury behind the FDIC and FSLIC. This resolution11
established no formal mechanism by which an illiquid deposit insurer could tap
Treasury resources. Moreover, its legal force expired with the Congress that
passed it. Nevertheless, it was used in 1985 to justify a nationwide advertising
campaign (sponsored by a special-purpose industry foundation) that proclaimed that
the full faith and credit of the U.S. government lies behind FSLIC guarantees. A
prototypical ad is displayed in Figure One. To my mind, the failure of even a single
Congressman or Senator either to issue a public denial or to urge the Federal Trade
Commission to label these ads untruthful testifies to the existence of a backdoor
equivalent of a full-faith-and-credit statute.
Ineffectiveness of Coverage Limitations
A further anomaly is that the desultory approach to recognizing and resolving
insolvencies at troubled firms employed by the FDIC and FSLIC extends de facto
guarantees to formally uninsured liabilities of their clients.This extended
coverage develops in two ways. First, when problems emerge at an individual
institution, agency personnel tend to delay definitive action. This gives uninsured
creditors, who are on balance more knowledgeable and more sophisticated than
fully insured depositors, time either to move their funds or to develop liabilities to
the problem firm that in most states can offset uninsured claims in the event of
liquidation. During the interim, the implied outflows of funds may in part be
financed by implicitly subsidized loans from the institution's Federal Reserve or
Federal Home Loan Bank. Second, once an insolvency is officially recognized, the
FDIC and FSLIC show a reluctance to close the institution and liquidate its
accounts. Their preference is to arrange a live-firm acquisition that keeps all
corporate contracts (including debt contracts) alive. These practices greatly
reduce the probability that uninsured creditors suffer losses in a failure. They
make a mockery of de jure limits set by statutory provisions meant to deny
coverage to nondeposit debt and to deposit balances in excess of $100,000.12
1985 Advertisement Suggesting That FSUC Is Formally Backed Up by
the Full Faith and Credit of the U.S. Government
Figure One13
Political and bureaucratic pressure to keep institutions alive isparticularly intense
when problems occur at a very large institution or when a substantial number of
clients are threatened simultaneously by a well-publicized common difficulty.
Limitations on the resources and personnel available to deal with largeor
widespread problems reinforce authorities' propensity to temporize and to find
ways to avoid straightforward recognition of agency losses. Important asymmet-
ries exist between the slight criticism authorities have received forrepeatedly
bailing out formally uninsured parties and the extensive reputational damageangry
uninsured creditors can inflict on agency leaders (damage that--as1985
experience in Ohio and Maryland demonstrates --couldbecome unbearably painful
if the failure of a large institution or industry segment were to spread a loss of
confidence onto other firms). Before uninsured creditors can be made truly to feel
uninsured, a mechanism for informing taxpayers and institutionalizing their criti-
cism would have to develop to correct this asymmetry in bureaucratic incentives.
Techniques of Insolvency Resolution and Loss Management
Alternative techniques for resolving a client insolvency differ principally in
the extent to which managers, stockholders, and/or formally uninsured creditors
are subsidized. Where subsidies occur, the techniques differ further in the extent
to which actual and potential subsidies are hidden from taxpayer view.
Unsubsidized Approaches. The simplest way to resolve a client insolvency is
for private parties voluntarily to invest enough additional capital in the enterprise
to bring its net-worth account back up to regulatory standards. When this
additional capital comes entirely from assessments levied against existing stock-
holders or from new equity issues sold in the securities markets, the adjustment is
an unassisted recapitalization, Deposit insurers effectively sell all or part of the
firm back to its stockholders. When the additional capital comes entirely from a
new investor group seeking to purchase the deposit institution's charter, the14
transaction is called an "unassisted purchase and assumption." What is "purchased"
is the institution's corporate assets and what is "assumed" is its corporate
liabilities.
Whenever private investors prove unwilling to pay the insurer a positive price
for the insolvent firm's charter, the insurer experiences a loss. It may resolve that
loss in several ways. Conceptually, the most straightforward method is to pay off
insured depositors and proceed as receiver to liquidate the corporation.In a
liquidation and payoff, the corporation's assets are assigned to and managed by the
insurer's liquidation division. This division collects the cash flows from asset sales,
interest receipts, and loan repayments and allocates them to the firm's creditors
more or less as it receives them. Until their claims are fully satisfied, the insurer
and the uninsured creditors participate on a pro rata basis in all funds that are
recovered.
When recoveries fall short of nonequity claims, the insurer and uninsured
creditors are said to take a percentage "haircut," defined as the loss suffered per
dollar of claims. Even when their claims are eventually paid in full, uninsured
creditors suffer an interim loss of liquidity in that they lose their right to receive
funds at the dates specified in their debt contract. Should recoveries in liquidation
exceed nonequity claims, the excess would flow to the failed firm's stockholders.
To lessen uninsured creditors' loss of liquidity, deposit insurers have occasion-
ally employed a variation of the liquidation-and-payoff technique in which the
insurer pays uninsured creditors when the institution is closed a conservative
estimate of the recoverable portion of their claims. In these "modified payoffs,"
the deposit insurer typically makes a second payment when the corporation's
liquidation is completed, restoring a portion of the "financial hair" that uninsured
creditors were initially assessed.15
Subsidized Approaches. Drawing on the metaphor of a foundering boat,
popular usage employs the term "bailout" to describe situations in which the insurer
subsidizes some combination of a failing firm's managers, stockholders, and
uninsured creditors. In one way or another, important portions of ex ante and ex
post deposit-insurance subsidies to failing firms are hidden from plain view.
Taxpayer boats have been sailing alongside foundering deposit-institution vessels,
but so far few taxpayers have noticed how much water deposit insurers have
surreptitiously pumped into the bottom of their boats.
Although the fact of a loss is obvious in the case of an assisted recapitaliza-
tion or takeover, the financial instruments in which the loss is encased (e.g.,
income-maintenance guarantees or exemptions from antitrust laws or burdensome
regulations) often make it hard for outside observers to set an unambiguous value
on the amount of assistance involved. Even less visible is the substantial market
value that insurer and central-bank life support has for economically insolvent
institutions. For an insolvent firm to have its deposit debt in denominationsup to
$100,000 fully guaranteed by a federal agency permits andencourages it to
undertake last-ditch risky plays at taxpayer expense. These desperateattempts to
make a killing before the insurer can get around to resolving the insolvency have
been likened to the length-of-the-field "Hail Mary"passes that football coaches
face a parallel incentive to call during the last few plays of a losing contest.
To counter the incentive for insolvent firms to undertake risky endgame plays
whose costs accrue asymmetrically to the guarantor, theirmanagers are often
required to sign a formal supervisory agreement with the insurer. Such contracts
range from agreements to avoid a specific list of prohibited actions to require-
ments that force managers to clear all significant business decisions with the
insurer before they may be undertaken. Given bureaucratic delays and bureaucrats'
reluctance to approve even sound moves, subsidized financial lifesupport that is16
accompanied by a strict supervisory agreement shades very rapidly into de facto
nationalization.
Nationalization. De facto nationalization occurs when the affairs of the
insolvent firm pass directly or indirectly under the control of a federal agency. As
with firms operating under a strict supervisory agreement, insurers sometimes
soften the fact of nationalization by: (1) disguising their ownership position as
uncompensated forbearance or in options and warrant positions, and (2) by
contracting with a third party to manage the firm. De facto nationalization has so
far been conceived as a temporary step, meant to permit the agency to search for
acceptable private bids for the institution's charter over a less pressing time
frame. For example, this is the justification authorities offered in 1984 for the de
facto nationalization of Continental Illinois which the FDIC achieved by taking a
large options position in the firm's stock.
Reversing effective ownership positions has absorbed substantial time and
effort. During the 1980s, FSLIC has engaged in temporary de facto nationalization
in two different ways. In 1982, the agency evolved the form of joint conservator-
ship known as the phoenix plan. This plan was employed in seven cases where it
proved possible to combine several insolvent firms in a given regional market into a
single corporation. Each phoenix corporation was recapitalized by FSLIC, which in
turn appointed some or all of the firm's board of directors. In 1986, FSLIC may
arguably be said to have reprivatized the last two of these institutions. But in the
meantime, their place in de facto nationalization has been taken by roughly 60
institutions enlisted into a follow-up scheme known as the management consign-
ment program. In this program, FSLIC appoints new directors and assigns the
management of the corporation to a team of executives assembled by a healthy
savings institution or other private contractor (which the insurer may have had to
cajole or pressure into taking on the job). Although it usually does not formally17
recapitalize the successor corporation, FSLIC's deeper involvement in the firm
conjecturally strengthens its informal guarantees.Both programs have the
advantage of taking the original stockholders and managers of the failed institution
out of the game, thereby permitting FSLIC to balance its pre-existing asymmetric
position by taking over the upside of bets it is already guaranteeing. Such
temporary trusteeships also permit a more graceful evaluation and unwinding of
the troubled firm's detailed losses.
Because the universe of potential private buyers for individual institutions
has proved restricted in practice, buying time to develop a reliable balance sheet
makes a great deal of sense, particularly in reprivatizing large institutions. What
doesn't make sense is not requiring insured institutions to develop and maintain
such balance sheets as a matter of course. Moreover, it needs to be recognized
that during periods of temporary nationalization formal linkage to the deposit
insurer may give nationalized deposit institutions competitive advantages in
particular markets and that interim managements face various conflicts of interest
and strong incentives to pay an excessive price for deposit funds. Given FSLIC
officials' own agency problems (exemplified by insurers' concerns for impeding the
flow of information about their own operations to taxpayers), it is virtually
impossible for them to write a management contract that can give an interim
trustee a set of incentives that is fully compatible with the interests of the insurer.
Finally, experience suggests that authorities seldom unwind the temporary nation-
alization of a large institution promptly. This is because squaring up such a firm's
affairs almost never occupies an urgent place on the public agenda once it has been
nationalized and is bound in any case to force the insurer to recognize explicitly
some embarrassing losses. This argues for setting up a strict timetable for either
liquidating nationalized positions or converting them into warrants.18
Link Between Deposit-Insurance Guarantees and Emergency Federal Reserve
Lending
Deposit insurance serves two ostensible purposes.Microeconomically, it
benefits depositors (especially small and unsophisticated ones) by undertaking the
task of investigating and guaranteeing the credit of individual deposit institutions.
This avoids duplication in credit evaluation by centralizing the process in a way
that puts the FDIC and FSLIC into the collective shoes of what would otherwise be
unprotected depositors (Black, Miller, and Posner, 1978).
The value of these services is clearly contingent on the policies that the
Federal Reserve establishes regarding the access it affords illiquid and even
insolvent firms to central-bank credit. To assure systemwide financial stability,
central banks in every modern country are required to function as lenders of last
resort to deposit institutions. They forestall actual and potential runs on illiquid
individual institutions by standing ready to liquify their assets. They do this by
accepting various of these institutions' high-quality assets as collateral for central-
bank loans.
The Federal Reserve promises to lend on good collateral to any solvent
deposit institution that experiences a run. The existence of this pledge means that
deposit insurance is not necessary to prevent irrational runs on solvent institutions.
From a macroeconomic point of view, deposit insurance functions as a redundant,
fail-safe system designed to back up last-resort lending in case cautious Federal
Reserve lending (as it did in the 1930s) either undermines or fails to preserve public
confidence in deposit institutions.
III. Why Deposit Insurance Needs to Be Reformed
Incentive Asymmetries Are Undermining Public Confidence.
Federal deposit insurance currently subsidizes in a largely hidden way
important categories of deposit-institution risk-bearing. These subsidies are rooted19
in two incentive asymmetries. First, deposit institutions face an incentive to
"game" their federal guarantor. In effect, voluntarily increasing the riskiness of
their enterprise increases the net value of the guarantee they receive. At the level
of the individual firm, deposit-insurance subsidies to risk-bearing increase as the
volatility of the firm's earnings increases and as the market value of stockholder-
contributed capital declines. Second, elected politicians and regulators face
similar incentives to game the federal taxpayer, by denying and concealing the full
impact of unfavorable economic developments at insured institutions.Taken
together, these incentive problems create a system of guarantees that over time
has grown increasingly costly, unfair, dangerous, and unreliable.
These incentive breakdowns underlie multifold weaknesses in the deposit-
insurance scheme. To highlight systemic problems, it is useful to think of deposit-
insurance arrangements as a 50-yearold chain whose links have been weakened
unevenly by the effects of age. Grouping individual links in the chain into four
subsystems underscores the wide range of repairs needed to restore the chain to
socially appropriate levels of long-run strength and reliability. First, techniques
for measuring client and insurer performance make up an information subsystem.
Second, techniques for gathering this information in timely fashion and tracking its
implications for client and insurer risk exposure aggregate into a monitoring
subsystem. Third, techniques by which federal regulators use this information to
control client and insurer risk exposures constitutes a regulatory-response
subsystem. Finally, costs and benefits generated by the first three subsystems and
by weaknesses in parallel taxpayer systems for monitoring and critiquing the
performance of the insurers create an incentive subsystem, which governs the
behavior of all parties to the contract.
Defects in the incentive subsystem are intensified by weaknesses in the
information, monitoring, and regulatory-response subsystems.Depositors that20
perceived themselves to be fully and perfectly guaranteed would have no incentive
to guard against deposit-institution risk-taking. This concern wouldbe transferred
entirely to the guarantor. However, to resolve all doubt about the willingnessand
ability of the institution to live up to its obligations, depositors must also evaluate
the financial resources and integrity of the guarantor. Whenever a possibility
exists that the guarantor may not fully discharge its liabilities, depositors must
look into the identity and strength of whatever parties effectively guarantee the
guarantor. The back-up guarantors for federal deposit insurance are parties on
whom regulators and legislators may be expected in a crisis to dump the financial
burden of financing the agencies' shortfall. These potential ratepayers may be
grouped into three tiers:(I) the stronger members of the pool of institutions
directly covered by the troubled fund; (2) other close competitors of institutionsin
this pooi, whom authorities may presume to derive some potentially taxable benefit
from the associated exit of troubled firms from the market; and (3) the general
taxpayer.
The more reasonable it seems to doubt whether federal insurers can service
their contingent obligations from their own resources, the more reasonable it
becomes to worry about how smoothly and effectively the political system could
distribute the burden of recapitalizing them across the three tiers of back-up
guarantors. When insolvencies in state-sponsored deposit-insurance corporationsin
Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, and Maryland revealed themselves in recent years,
settlement of their outstanding liabilities was greatly delayed as back-up guaran-
tors who professed to be surprised by their plight actively resisted legislative
efforts to levy a share of the liability shortfall on them.
The hidden nature of deposit-insurance costs means that the liquidity of
effective guarantees declines as aggregate guarantees grow relative to explicit
agency resources. Empirical evidence for thisnotion may be found in the high21
deposit interest rates paid by zombie S&Ls (Barth, Brumbaugh, and Sauerhaft,
1986) and the partial runoff of jumbo CDs at insured S&Ls in late 1985 and early
1986. Rational depositors need to wonder about how aware the back-up guarantors
are of their exposure and about how resistant these guarantors would prove if they
were suddenly presented with a claim clearly stating their potential liability.
Unjustifiable Expense of the System
The hidden cost of guaranteeing deposit-institution debt surged dramatically
during the 1970s and is still growing in the 1980s. First, increased volatility in the
economic environment has made pre-existing guarantees more valuable and intensi-
fied risk-taking incentives at the margin. Second, secular trends in interest rates
and in risk-taking have weakened managerial disincentives to risk-taking by
reducing both industry capital and the incremental career risk inherent in go-for-
broke loan and investment activity. Managers of decapitalized institutions learn to
view themselves as minor-league Lee lacoccas. Failing to revive their moribund
firms can do little additional damage to their careers, but they can expect to reap
great personal glory if in the face of fearsome odds they succeed in executing a
winning strategy. Third, myopic insolvency-resolution policies followed by the
FDIC and FSLIC have held harmless virtually all creditors of such large institutions
as First Pennsylvania, Franklin National, U.S. National, Continental Illinois, and
Financial Corporation of America. These policies have extended what the market
perceives to be the effective coverage and perfection of conjectural guarantees at
large institutions without at the same time establishing a mechanism for bringing
the aggregate value of these guarantees back under control. Finally, although
stating only an unenforceable sense of Congress that the full faith and credit of the
U.S. Treasury stands behind the federal deposit-insurance agencies, a now-expired
March 1982 joint Congressional Resolution reinforced market speculation that
Congress ultimately stands willing to make good any de jure insolvency the deposit-
insurance agencies might experience.22
However, the de jure insolvency of a federal insurer could trigger a time-
consuming Congressional debate about loss distribution that might painfully prolong
the associated bureaucratic breakdown. This possibility makes the existence of de
facto deposit-insurer insolvency a matter of grave concern and creates a need to
narrow the odds that one of the federal deposit insurers might actually experience
a de jure insolvency. Making back-up guarantors clearly aware of the size and
nature of their potential liabilities may be the only way to build a coalition for
deposit-insurance reform. A key point in the case for long-run reform is the
likelihood that informed taxpayers would not have been willing to accept the
burden that misreported agency promises have inefficiently foisted upon them.
Each successive increment in the perfection or extent of conjectural guarantees
becomes increasingly expensive to attain.In their individual insurance trans-
actions, taxpayers habitually select automobile policies that include deductibles
and major medical and surgical coverages that include coinsurance elements and
limitations on cumulative payouts. This shows individuals' informed response to the
high incremental costs of supporting perfect coverages. It strains credulity to
believe that parties willing to accept substantial amounts of risk everywhere else
in their portfolios would knowingly choose to pay the freight for virtually perfect
guarantees of the small subset of funds they and their fellow citizens choose to
hold in bank and thrift deposits.
The inefficiency of perfect guarantees does not imply that they be phased out
unintelligently. In particular, to walk away from them completely in the midst of a
potential crisis would be extremely dangerous.
Unfairness of Risk-Bearing Subsidies
Deposit insurance only subsidizes client risk-bearing at the margin. Any
institution that wished to operate riskiessly would find the explicit and implicit
premiums levied by the FDIC and FSLIC extremely burdensome. Deposit-insurance23
burdens decline and turn into subsidies as an institution's leverage and business risk
increase. Inequities in the treatment of conservative and risk-seeking manage-
ments are even greater when we recognize that less-risky institutions provide the
first two tiers of the system's back-up guarantees. Hence, a conservatively
managed firm's de facto burden increases with the riskiness of its higher-flying
(and more subsidized) competitors.
A second source of inequity comes from differences in the ways that
insolvencies at large and small institutions are resolved. Except where large-scale
fraud and defalcation create a substantial liability for undiscovered losses, deposit
insurers have repeatedly proved themselves reluctant to liquidate large institu-
tions. In such cases, keeping the corporation alive is administratively imprudent.
The insurer would have to indemnify any new owner against a series of unassessable
but potentially substantial claims. Using a phrase the Comptroller of the Currency
used during Congressional hearings on the Continental-Illinois rescue, some institu-
tions are seen to be "too large to liquidate." As long as insurers' resources hold
out, uninsured creditors of such institutions expect to be held harmless from what
we may call these institutions' wholly "honest" losses. This expectation makes the
difference in value between formally insured and uninsured deposits in part a
function of institutional size. Other things equal, a large institution receives a
better guarantee of its debts than a smaller one. This means that capital markets
must insist that smaller firms pay differentially higher interest rates on uninsured
funds. At the same time, without federal guarantees small institutions might not
be able to sell $100,000 CDs in national markets at reasonable interest rates.
Because insurers' information, monitoring, and regulatory-response subsystems fail
to impose appropriate regulatory burdens on large and particularly foreign-financed
institutions, in competing for large pools of funds small institutions' differentially
poorer guarantee aggravates their natural disadvantage.24
Short-Run Unreliability
Deposit-insurance subsidies to risk bearing encourage go-for-broke behavior,
whose consequences stand out most clearly in the case of "zombie" S&Ls. Zombie
institutions are those whose stockholder-contributed capital has become so nega-
tive that it is apt to describe them as examples of the "living dead." Like zombies
in horror films, funds in these institutional corpses are capable of locomotion and
tend to be put to malefic uses.
More generally, we may think of the financial sector of the U.S. economy as
a minefield seeded with unexploded losses in institutional holdings of low-rate
mortgages and in farm, construction, energy, and less-developed-country loans of
poor quality. Secular expansion in the size of the minefield, in the density of the
unexploded losses, and in their aggregate potential for financial violence is being
driven by a defective deposit-insurance incentive system that is subtly undermining
the systemic stability it is supposed to secure. The same defects in the system
have helped federal guarantees to displace stockholder-contributed capital as the
principal source of deposit-institution equity.
Inadequate FDIC and FSLIC risk-management systems and the absence of
explicit arrangements for funding the pledge of Treasury faith and credit that is
perceived to back the insurance funds open up the possibility of bureaucratic
breakdown. Recent deposit-insurance crises in Ohio and Maryland demonstrate
that a volatile and competitive financial environment can provide elected officials
dangerous opportunities for misplaying a developing crisis.
Without a deep pocket into which to cram losses more or less as they occur,
maintenance of public confidence in the insurance funds depends on maintaining
public confidence that regulators and elected officials can deal with emerging
problems in a roughly optimal manner. As mere human beings, government
officials cannot prove equal to every task the economy puts before them. Hence,25
inany period in which the insurance agencies have become decapitalized, the
system could break down anytime.
Long-Run Danger
Although on any given day the probability of a bureaucratic breakdown
remains extremely small, if the current system is maintained over the indefinite
future, the occurrence of a breakdown seems nearly inevitable. Moreover, even if
a breakdown can be avoided, the government is accumulating a growing equity
stake in deposit institutions that amounts to a de facto and unintended nationaliza-
tion. At a troubled or agressively managed firm, the market value of its FDIC or
FSLIC guarantee looms much larger than stockholder-contributed equity. The
value of any such guarantee may be conceived in either of two complementary
ways, as the capitalized value of the interest saving the guarantee affords an
insured institution or as the capitalized value of the net costs that supporting the
guarantee imposes on the insurer. So that taxpayers can readily observe how well
the FDIC and FSLIC control their risk exposure, guarantee values need to be
estimated for every troubled firm and at least the aggregate value of these
guarantees need to be reported by each guarantor agency. To protect taxpayers'
interest, changes in the value of a firm's guarantee need to be made the focus of
regulatory decisions about forbearance, closure, or recapitalization.
For policy purposes, the value of insurer guarantees needs to be recognized
explicitly as an equity position and made the centerpiece of an energetic program
of reprivatization. Disguising de facto nationalization as management-consign-
ment, consent-agreement, net-worth-certificate, "phoenix plan," and regulatory-
accounting programs allows regulators and legislators to keep taxpayers from
confronting honestly and in timely fashion the long-run costs of replacing private
capital with government capital and of continuing to distort private decisions by a
combination of subsidies to risk-taking and expanded bureaucratic intervention. In26
particular, misguided efforts to minimize accounting measures of the federal
deficit while preserving FSLIC liquidity are simultaneously expanding and com-
plicating the problems posed by zombie S5cLs.
In the face of our nation's ideological commitment to free markets, it is both
tragic and ironic to note that it may be on its way to nationalizing unintentionally
a large segment of its deposit-institution industry. By failing to control the value
of deposit-insurance guarantees, federal deposit insurers are making it increasingly
likely that in the long run excercising their option to take over a large bundle of
insolvent deposit institutions becomes the politically expedient way to balance
taxpayers' equity interest in these institutions.The larger this nationalized
industry segment turns out to be, the greater the potential waste of government
operation and the larger the potential for corruption in its reprivatization.
IV. Developing a Workable Package of Subsystem Reforms
Although federal deposit insurance worked well enough during its first thirty
years, surges in economic volatility during the 1970s and 1980s placed it under
increasing strain.This is because the federal deposit-insurance corporations
adapted less rapidly and less completely to the changing economic environment
than the institutions whose deposits they guarantee. Deposit institutions have
expanded their aggregate access to subsidies by making obsolete various of the
concepts and techniques by which deposit insurers have traditionally tracked,
managed, and priced their risk exposure in client operations. FDIC and FSLIC
managers have been slow to perceive (and even slower to counteract) the risk
consequences of their clients' cumulative adaptation to change. Because corporate
survival and employee jobs would have been on the line, a private guarantor would
have innovated more rapidly and more symmetrically to offset the ways in which
market developments and nontraditional client activities burdened its own profit-
ability.27
As an organizing device, we may think of insurers and deposit institutions as
engaged in a long automobile race. Whereas the deposit-institution cars are built
to state-of-the-art specifications and maintained carefully, the insurers' cars show
many weaknesses in design and maintenance. Insurer windshields (a metaphor for
information subsystems) are caked with dirt and grease, making it hard for them to
see where they and their rivals are going. Insurer driver seats (i.e., monitoring
subsystems) are installed at right angles to the road, making their drivers have to
strain even to process the information the dirty windshields make available. Third,
braking, steering, and power controls on insurers' cars (i.e., regulatory-response
subsystems) lack power-boosting and operate with distinct lags.Finally, the
method of financing the race and awarding prize money creates an incentive
subsystem that offers a much greater range of rewards to daring and skillful
deposit-institution drivers and pit crews than their counterparts on the regulatory
team can hope to attain.
Recognizing what is wrong with the existing system is the first step in
planning improvements. As both the racing car and chain metaphors emphasize, to
improve the deposit-insurance system we must strengthen each subsystem in
balanced fashion. Along with the overlay of divergent political interests, the need
for balance is what makes deposit-insurance reform such a tricky business.
Our analysis focuses on the effectiveness, feasibility, and opportunity costs
of alternative components of subsystem reform. It seeks to underscore the need
for research on identifying minimally disruptive combinations of reforms among
which informed policymakers may reasonably choose.
Information Subsystem
The keystone of effective reform is developing a clean windshield, i.e.,
access to meaningful information on client performance and portfolio values.28
Authorities need to receive financial statements that convey the information that
a rational private guarantor would want to receive.
Since 1938, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) have authorized
deposit institutions to carry assets whose scheduled cash flows are relatively
current at historical acquisition cost, even when these assets' market prices are
known to diverge significantly from this book value. Novel and irregular regulatory
accounting rules adopted by FSLIC in the early 1980s (RAP) permit S&Ls to treat
some classes of debt to regulators as capital injections and to book unrealized gains
over acquisition costs on selected classes of appreciated assets without having
symmetrically to recognize parallel losses on depreciated items. Although RAP
improves on GAAP by permitting appraised increments in value to be booked, in
practice, by selectively ignoring appraised declines in value, RAP can be used to
support an even more severe overstatement of a troubled firm's net worth.
For assessing guarantor risk exposure, either set of principles is inferior to
market-value accounting, which requires that the carrying value of all assets and
nonequity liabilities be marked to their current market values at the end of every
accounting period. Market-value accounting further improves on GAAP and RAP
by seeking to assign values to every element of what economists call the firm's
"extended" balance sheet. Insurers' risk exposure varies with the capitalized value
of all items capable of contributing positively or negatively to the firm's future
income. Insurers need to treat the concept of an off-balance-sheet item as a
contradiction in terms.
Because GAAP and RAP approve of omitting hard-to-value items and
carrying even readily priced assets and liabilities at historical costs, they lend
themselves to deceptive use when applied to financial institutions. To illustrate
the distortion, let us contrast the effects of gimmicky sale-and-leaseback trans-
actions in appreciated assets on GAAP, RAP, and market-value balance sheets.29
Such transactions increase a firm's capital under GAAP and would permit capital to
be overstated under RAP (because the lease obligation need not be booked).
Market—value accounting reveals that these transactions may actually weaken the
firm by making deferrable gains on the price appreciation immediately taxable.
Suggestions for Change. Market-value accounting provides a reliable measure of
firm performance in volatile times and sets up objective principles for measuring
firm capital that are difficult for managers to manipulate with impunity. Market-
value accounting requires managers and accountants to engage in potentially
actionable fraud whenever they seek to create the appearances of profitability and
of positive stockholder-contributed capital where these conditions do not truly
exist.
To assess an institution's risk exposure properly, an accounting scheme cannot
relegate important sources of risk to an "unbookable" category. That positions
unrecorded by GAAP threaten deposit insurers is acknowledged by 1985 decisions
imposing regulatory discipline on bank positions in standby letters of credit and
daylight overdrafts. Similarly, if capital is to serve as a reliable criterion for
tightening or loosening regulatory penalties, capital must be measured compre-
hensively. To let taxpayers see the true effects of deposit insurance on the capital
of insurers and insured institutions, it is desirable to enter the aggregate market
value of FDIC and FSLIC guarantees on the balance sheets of each agency.
Recording these values as a liability to insurers would reveal a hole in insurer
financing that is offset by unspecified claims on their back-up guarantors.
Recording corresponding values as assets for insured institutions would reveal how
large a role deposit-insurance guarantees play in maintaining the de jure solvency
of firms threatened by large holdings of low-interest or poor-quality loans. When
authorities permit firms to operate that are de facto insolvent, they implicitly
waive covenants on client net worth that are meant to reduce the fundamental30
asymmetry in the guarantor's participation in the institution's future gains and
losses. Unless an equity claim is created to balance the position, such waivers are
transfer payments that supply equity funds on terms that become progressively
more favorable as the extent of the firm's de facto insolvency increases. This is
because the percentage of future losses that accrue to the guarantor increases as
the firm's stockholder-contributed capital declines.
As financial innovations expand the universe of marketable instruments that
are comparable to assets that do not actually trade, the feasibility of market-value
accounting increases correspondingly.Appraisers can:(1) employ prices in
secondary markets for comparable instruments, (2) use prices inherent in securitiz-
ed obligations that are collateralized by cash flows from similar assets, (3)request
that information be generated by insurer auctions of hard-to-value assets, (4)
utilize the methods that investment bankers use to price takeover bids, and (5)
drawon computer models linking movements in loan values to movements in prices
of bonds that have similar features or that raise similar valuation issues. Finally,
for franchise values and other intangible assets, the task of agreeing on objective
valuation procedures can be assigned to a self-regulatory board.
Difficulties involved in instituting market-value accounting are almost
entirely problems of transition. Careful financial analysts regularly attempt to
translate a firm's records into market-value terms and most well-managed finan-
cial institutions already employ market-value accounting in internal evaluations of
their own performance. While the resulting performance measurements are subject
to some degree of inaccuracy, it is crucial to recognize that, on average (and
especially for troubled firms), market-value readings provide more reliable
measure of firm strength than either GAAP or RAP does.
Permitting or mandating market-value reports of performance to deposit-
institution customers is a relatively low-cost way of improving market discipline on31
insureds and insurers alike. It would make the existing monitoring, response, and
incentives systems work more cheaply, more fairly, and more reliably. Recogniz-
ing this makes it clear that the strength of industry and regulatory resistance to
market-value accounting is a major obstacle to effective deposit-insurance reform.
The ad hoc alternative to market-value accounting has been to require
footnotes to GAAP reports to communicate supplementary information describing
"significant" changes in off-balance-sheet activities and unrealized gains and
losses. The problem with this approach is that it assigns authorities rather than the
market the task of deciding precisely when various potential sources of income and
loss become "significant" enough to report. Such a system lengthens undesirable
lags in adapting information flows to the realities of changing markets. Moreover,
government and industry regulators have repeatedly signalled their willingness to
help troubled deposit institutions to cook their books. The Financial Accounting
Standards Board has opposed booking appraisal values and long tolerated booking
the capitalized value of various fees as income exclusive of associated future
costs. Moreover, the Board's Statement of linancial Accounting Standards Number
15 supports efforts to defer charging off losses on problem loans by requiring only
that lenders restructure debt contracts creatively enough that future cash inflows
on the restructured debt can be "reasonably estimated" to equal at least the
principal value of the loan. These parties' willingness to help deposit institutions
hide their losses from outside observers indicates how, in a discretionary reporting
system, sectoral political pressures can overcome taxpayer and uninsured-creditor
rights to know.
Monitoring Subsystem
We have likened regulators' information subsystem to a racing car's wind-
shield and their monitoring subsystem to the angle at which a vehicle's driver's seat
is installed. The issues in monitoring are how often regulators look through the32
windshield, whether they use technological opportunities to boost their vision to
the 20-20 level, and what sort of problems they keep an eye out for.
Traditionally, agency monitoring efforts have focused on sending teams of
field examiners at reasonable intervals to conduct an onsite examination of each
client firm's accounts. Except in densely populated regions, agency examiners
spend much of their working week on the road in unfamiliar and oftenhostile
environments. Their principal tasks are to review financial statements (typically
audited ones), to analyze the institutions' earnings and the quality of its loans and
investments, and to evaluate the adequacy of the firm's management, liquidity,and
capital. The information is pulled together into a formal examination reportthat
points out strengths and weaknesses in the firm's operation. In turn,this narrative
report is summarized in a so-called CAMEL rating, which gradesinstitutions on a
five-point scale. The acronym CAMEL reflects the main categories of condition
and performance on which client institutions are graded: capital; asset quality;
management competence and integrity; earnings; and liquidity. Althoughthe full
report is presented to the institution's board of directors, only onefederal agency
(the FDIC) also gives the board the CAMEL grade, which is necessary to place the
report in sharp managerial perspective.
Institutions whose CAMEL rating is 4 or .5 are labelled as "problems" and
subjected to more frequent examination and special of fsite scrutiny. Offsite
monitoring looks at market data, public disclosures, and periodic reportsfiled with
various regulators. To some extent, of fsite analysis is also used as an early-
warning system to spot institutions that have encountered difficulty sincetheir last
examination so that the date of their next examination may be moved up.
Because troubled and aggressively managed institutions often seek to hide
their problems from their auditors, customers, and regulators, it is not safe to take
institutions' accounts and financial statements at face value. Although examiners
are not specifically asked to examine for fraud, they sometimesdetect it.33
Another class of monitoring complications concerns the difficulty ofmeasur-
ing the extent to which an institution is exposed to risk through the operations of
associated firms. To minimize their net tax and regulatory burden, stockholders
have found it advantageous to layer their ownership through holding companies and
to locate activities that are taxed or regulated differentially in a series of
carefully structured subsidiary and affiliated corporations. When a subsidiary or
affiliated firm runs into trouble, it is hard for regulators to stop the resources of
the regulated deposit institution from being used to bail it out. This difficulty
makes it inappropriate to analyze the capital and balance sheet of a deposit
institution independent from those of its related firms.
Suggestions for Change. In at least three respects, agency monitoring efforts are
controversial. First, jurisdictional problems degrade the information flow. The
resolution of jurisdictional overlaps has shifted the responsibility forexamining
important classes of institutions from the insurers who directly bear the risk
inherent in client operations to state chartering agencies or to other federal
regulators. It also creates blockages in the flow of relevant information among the
multiple regulators.The task of minimizing these problems is assigned to
coordinating bodies such as the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS).Second, as financial
innovation complicated the examination process and as the number of problem
institutions proliferated, the size, training, and experience of the field examination
force became progressively less adequate. This problem traces both to the
vagaries of agency budget allocations and to agency or Office of Management and
Budget unwillingness to pay-high-enough salaries or to establish a sufficiently
attractive career ladder for examiners to overcome the lifestyle burdens of the
job. Third, the nature of of fsite and onsite analysis could be improved in obvious
ways. In particular, critics would like to see examiners focus more sharply on34
frauddetectionand make more use of electronic and remote means of analysis. It
seems clear that greater emphasis on electronic reporting could reduce the number
of weeks the average examiner would have to spend in the field and would diversify
examiner activities and raise skill levels in ways that are likely to support higher
profiles of career compensation. Examiner performance would also benefit from
being more directly exposed to public second-guessing. Knowing that examiner
evaluations could be criticized by outsiders and compared with those of private
rating agencies would put pressure on agency managers to reduce what is now
considerable idiosyncratic variation in the quality and character of individual
examinations.
During the last two years, federal regulators have to some degree responded
to all of these criticisms. In May 1986, federal bank regulators agreed to share
supervisory information with state supervisors. Similarly, in the face of a growing
interstate extension of state-chartered firms, CSBS is urging the states to develop
mechanisms for sharing supervisory information among themselves. At the federal
level, insurers' jurisdiction over problem institutions has been expanded. Federal
regulators have also begun to enlarge their examination force and to make better
use of deposit-rate and other available data to target their examinations. The
change is especially marked at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), which
in JuIy 1985 moved its examination function off-budget to the Federal Home Loan
Banks and doubled the authorized size of the system's examiner workforce. Before
these moves took place, whereas the federal banking regulators had more than two
examiners for every five FDIC-insured firms, the FHLBB had only about one
examiner for every five FSLIC-insured institutions. Because the pool of skilled and
experienced examiners is far smaller than the number of available positions at the
different agencies, curing the shortage of able examiners depends on regulators'
success in attracting qualified personnel from related fields and in establishing35
appropriateprograms for training examiners. Finally, the possibility of following
the FDIC's lead in releasing examiner ratings to directors is at least being
discussed at other agencies and the possibility that institutions may someday be
permitted to advertise examination ratings no longer seems farfetched.
Regulators and trade associations reveal a strong preference for accounting
principles that convey options to conceal material facts. While this preference
keeps the regulatory windshield almost as dirty as ever, improvements in agency
monitoring subsystems have encountered far less political opposition.
Regulatory-Response or Enforcement Subsystem
At institutions for which adverse trends and potential losses have been
identified, the problem becomes one of bringing the insurer's exposure in these
firms back under control. Corrective pressure can be generated in either of two
complementary ways, either implicitly by reinforcing market discipline or explicit-
ly by increasing regulatory discipline.
Market discipline concerns penalties that the market imposes onmanagers,
stockholders, and uninsured creditors. For regulators, reinforcing market discipline
is mainly a matter of making or at least permitting timely disclosure of material
facts to depositors and other customers who see themselves exposed to loss. As
the proviso makes clear, unless deposit-insurance guarantees are seen to be
imperfect or incomplete, this discipline cannot operate at all. It is in this sense
that reforms in the insurance contract such as lowering de jure accountcoverage
below $100,000 or introducing deductibles, coinsurance, or lifetime limits on
depositor recoveries can be said to enhance market discipline. Considered as a test
of the feasibility of generating depositor discipline by curtailing de facto bailouts
of uninsured creditors, the eight modified payoffs that the FDIC conducted in early
1984 were enormously successful. The efficacy of this exploratory policy is
evidenced by the run on Continental Illinois that followed close upon the experi-
ment and scared authorities into abandoning their use of this procedure.36
Capital requirements and activity limitations hold the key role in generating
regulatory discipline, but a range of other policy tools exists. These tools may be
thought of as ways of adjusting deposit-institution cars to make them slower or less
maneuverable. Regulators' rights to tailor adjustments to individual situations are
tempered by legal and political constraints. Client institutions are entitled to due
process, which means a right to formal notice, private evidentiary hearings,and
subsequent appeals. A May 1986 decision by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that, even with a favorable ruling from an administrative law judge, the Comptroll-
er of the Currency cannot levy penalties against bank directors without also going
through the U.S. District Court system. In principle, regulatory mechanics cannot
safely touch a deposit institution's car until they have won either a court order or a
negotiated settlement. In practice, regulators' ability to release information that
could prove embarrassing to client managers often helps to intimidate problem
firms into settling rather than litigating proposed regulatory actions.
The least oppressive type of settlement agreement between regulators and
client managers is known as a memorandum of understanding or letter agreement.
As seen in the State of Ohio's repeated failure to win compliance with such
agreements from Home State Savings, letter agreements are not strictly enforce-
able in the courts. Unscrupulous institutions can persist in the behavior they have
agreed to eschew, safe from specific penalty. However, having made and violated
such agreements puts an institution at a severe disadvantage in fighting formal
enforcement actions.
In recent years, the number of more formal actions has trended sharply
upward with the number of problem institutions. In order of escalating impact,
these tougher actions include: directives to raise additional capital within a fixed
period of time, cease-and-desist orders; fines levied on officers, directors, and
negligent outside auditors; actions to remove particular officers or directors; and37
proceedingsto terminate insurance. Although individual problem institutions have
little scope for winning relief either from prevailing capitalrequirements and
activity restrictions or from specific directives to raise additional capital, the
three actions listed next are usually embodied in negotiated "consentagreements,"
in which (as in a plea bargain) clientmanagers typically give up their right to
contest the action in exchange for a favorable adjustment in the penalties to which
they are exposed. Because proceedings to terminate insurance takeup to two
years to complete, their main value to regulators is to serve as a bargaining threat.
Thisthreatis enhanced by the disruptive influence that instituting formal
proceedings can have on the institution's liquidity. A dimunition in liquidity would
strengthen the insurer's hands by making it easier to have the problem firm
declared legally insolvent.
The ultimate enforcement action is a declaration of insolvencyby the
chartering authority, which usually authorizes the insurer to wrest control from
existing managers and stockholders.The range of techniques available for
resolving insolvencies is reviewed in section II of this paper.
Suggestions for Change. To control client risk-taking, the currentresponse
subsystem relies almost exclusively on bureaucratically administered regulatory
restraints (as opposed to market discipline). In this same vein, newregulatory
powers and improved monitoring subsystems form the dominant elements of reform
proposals currently receiving official consideration. That hopes can be raised high
by out_of-balance reform proposals testifies to voters' naive and inappropriate
trust in the capacity of bureaucrats to hold the system together against the
relentless forces of a disequilibrium administrative price for risk-bearing services.
These proposals seek to develop new opportunities to discipline clients and
greater freedom to wind up the affairs of problem institutions. Acting under
existing authority, regulators have proposed to raise existing capital requirements38
and to institute systems of risk-rated explicit premiums and risk-rated capital
requirements. Although the burden of these systems would vary with perceived
riskiness of individual institutions, so far no agency has formally linked its
proposals (as economic research would dictate) to estimates of the market value of
the guarantee services each institution receives.
In addition, various of the regulators have asked Congress for three types of
new authority: to take over "failing" as well as insolvent firms, to charge problem
institutions for costs of increased supervision, and to terminate insurance more
quickly. The FDIC is also interested in winning increased supervisory authority
over banks that belong to the Federal Reserve System and in attaining passage of a
statute that would give depositors in FOIC-insured banks preference in liquidation
over all other types of creditor.
Thinking of deposit insurance as a chain shows that inadequacies in regula-
tors' information subsystem cannot be fully counterbalanced by enhancing their
enforcement powers. It is clear is that, in the absence of information reforms,
enforcement powers must be expanded greatly before they can even appear to have
much impact on the flow of unintended subsidies. For example, because a market-
value test for insolvency is not being requested, authorities want the right to close
failing firms and the right to decide for themselves on the basis of unspecified
criteria whether or not a firm is "failing."However, such a scheme may
occasionally lead to the closure of sound firms and gives sectoral political
pressures for forbearance maximal opportunity to preserve unsound ones.It is
imprudent to plan to substitute regulators' judgment for market-based measures
either of what capital is or of what percentage capital requirements ought to apply
to different kinds of balance-sheet positions.In cases where the effective
marginal requirements exceed the fair market value of guarantee services, the
relevant business would tend to flow to uninsured institutions. On the other hand,
activities for which the requirements are too low would find themselves subsidized.39
Politically, unless a serious crisis develops, it is unrealistic for federal
regulators to expect to win such sweeping discretionary powers. Even though a
majority of the members of industry trade associations want to see high-flying
competitors brought under control, they have lobbied energetically against legisla-
tion that would grant regulators the authority to close institutions whoseopera-
tions come into disfavor. Managers and stockholders of even conservatively run
institutions fear that somewhere down the line such powers would be wielded
abusively.
Deposit insurers' risk management is strategically defective. It needs to be
reorganized in ways dictated by the common-sense principle of defensive
symmetry. This principle holds, for example, that a defensive basketball player
balance his weight and arrange his limbs in ways that create a mirror image of the
offensive player he is guarding. In this way, the defensive player can move with his
opponent laterally and diagonally to cut of f sudden drives to the basket. This
principle tells us that, when economic volatility forced deposit institutions to set
up sophisticated asset-liability committees (ALCOs) to monitor and control their
own risk exposure, federal deposit insurers would have benefitted from setting up
symmetric committees of their own and supported them with parallel information
and planning systems. The job of these systems would be to analyze at frequent
intervals the implications for extended agency balance sheets of risks taken by
members of a representative sample of client institutions. On the basis of this
analysis, unwanted positions that client behavior opened in each insurer's extended
balance sheet could be promptly identified and closed by offsetting investments
ordered by the agency's ALCO.
For the taxpayer, a further advantage of this strategy is that unwinding
unwelcome risks by explicit transactions would convert unintended deposit-insur-
ance subsidies into explicit expenses. Rather than hiding as off-budget items,40
inadvertent subsidies to risk-bearing by individual clients would raise agency
operating costs. Resulting agency deficits would alert politicians and the public of
the need to recalibrate explicit and implicit deposit-insurance premiums.
Insolvency Resolution and Pressures for Capital Forbearance. Pressures for capital
forbearance underscore the collision between regulators' duty to protect taxpayers'
economic interest and bureaucratic incentives to favor politically strong regional
or sectoral interests. Capital forbearance occurs when regulators explicitly lower
minimum capital requirements for decapitalized institutions (i.e., those from whom
deposit-insurance reserves most need protection). A policy of simple forbearance
waives a series of valuable covenants in insurance contracts without exacting any
a.•Duringthe last decade, capital forbearance was routinely extended
to hundreds of troubled S&Ls and mutual savings banks. In principle, this policy
"buys time" for troubled institutions to resolve their problems on their own. In
practice, unless insurers take a balancing equity claim, capital forbearance is
myopic. As the continued deterioration of zombie S&Ls demonstrates, decapital-
ization encourages last-ditch plays by insolvent institutions and tends to result in
larger overall economic losses for the insurer.
Prior to March 1986, the FDIC held firmly to a policy of covenant
enforcement for commercial banks. As political pressure to ease the strain on
agriculture and energy banks became intense, federal banking regulators stated
their intention to permit capital accounts at selected banks (those that are "well-
managed") to sink below minimum standards without triggering closer regulation
and to help these firms to defer charging off losses on restructured loans. Banks
that receive forbearance may operate with a ratio of primary capital to assets as
low as 4 percent and take up to seven years to raise this ratio back to the ordinary
5.5percentnorm. However, the details of different agencies' programs are less
important than the force of Congressional efforts to make sure that the need for
regulatory forbearance was communicated all the way down to the examiner level.41
Tougher insolvency resolution requires that the lender of last resort avoid
lending to insolvent institutions and that decision to pull the plug on individual
firms be given greater insulation from political pressure. To strengthen the
deposit-insurance agencies politically, they must first be strengthened financially.
They must be assigned sufficient resources to support the charge-offs inherent in
taking over client institutions before their capital is exhausted. Theymustalso
receive enough budgetary freedom to hire the staff they need to carry out the tasks of enforcing
solvency requirements and bridging the operation of decapitalized firms until private acquirers
or investors can be found. To make sure that solvency decisions are objective and economically
based, authorities and industry leaders must accept a more meaningful concept of legal
insolvency. The criterion developed must focus on the market value of stockholder—contributed
capital. Insolvency cannot be permitted to turn on an institution's liquidity, because liquidity
either is conveyed by federal deposit guarantees or, in truly severe cases, becomes a function of
discretionary eligibility criteria laid down by the lender of last resort. Nor can the test be
permitted to focus on traditional accounting measures of a firm's net worth, because this value
too is favorably impacted by federal guarantees and because existing accounting rules leave
firms and regulators considerable opportunity to conceal evidence of de facto insolvency.
Incentive Subsystem
The incentive subsystem comprises the collection of benefits and costs that reward and
punish particular kinds of behavior by parties that are directly or indirectly involved in deposit-
insurance contracts. These parties include politicians, insurance-agency personnel, managers and
stockholders of insured deposit institutions, deposit-institution depositors and borrowers, and
federal taxpayers.Defects in this system offer individual deposit-institution managers,
stockholders, and customers above-market rewards for engaging in administratively underdis-
ciplined types of risky transactions and create a flow of rents to politicians and regulators for
suppressing information about the consequences for taxpayers of the risks and bailouts that are
undertaken.42
Possibilities for Change. Different parties to the deposit-insurance contract possess different
sets of information and exercise different degrees of control. Reducing the risks to the system
therefore requires incentive compatibility between government agents (politicians and regula-
tors), their principals (taxpayers), and deposit-institution managers, stockholders, and Customers.
Several changes in the structure of the deposit-insurance contract could improve incentives
for depositors to monitor and respond to changes in a deposit institution's risk exposure. The
simplest class of adjustments would be to roll back maximum accountholder coverages.
Coverage rollbacks can be explicit or implicit. Implicit rollbacks aim at making statutory
coverage limitations more credible. This could be accomplished, for example, by enacting a
depositor-preference statute or adopting a policy of using modified payoffs for large-bank
failures. Explicit rollbacks would alter the terms of deposit-insurance guarantees in one of five
ways: reducing formal coverage limits; introducing a structure of participating coinsurance that
would require depositors to participate in realized losses (with the rate of participation tied, for
example, to account size or to the excess of an institution's offering rates on CDs over yields on
Treasury securities of similar maturity and liquidity); incorporating a deductible into losses in
excess of some relatively nominal threshold amount; establishing lifetime limits on the amount
an individual can collect from federal deposit insurers (to be monitored by the Internal Revenue
Service); or constraining contractually the riskiness of the activities that an insured institution
may undertake. The purpose of these reforms would be to reduce the completeness of deposit-
insurance coverage for depositors that are large and sophisticated enough to protect their
balances at lower social cost than federal regulators can.
Stockholder and insurer interests could be made more compatible by requiring changes in
the ownership structure of insured institutions. These changes consist of requiring insured
deposit institutions to be stockholder-owned by some target date and extending the liability of
stockholders in insured institutions in bonded fashion to a multiple of the par value of their
position in the firm. Because mutual deposit institutions are increasingly converting to stock
status voluntarily, the burden of converting the remaining mutual institutions is falling rapidly.43
Bonding, which is required to ensure prompt collectability, may involve nothing more complicat-
ed than maintaining in escrow with the institution or some other agent for the insurer a
collection of earning assets of assured value. Extending depositor liability promises to reduce
the value of deposit-insurance guarantees by establishing contingent claims on stockholders.
Because the ex ante value of FDIC rights to impose post-failure or other ex post assessments
would increase with an institution's leverage and other kinds of risk exposure, resulting declines
in deposit-institution stock prices would prove roughly proportional to market ratings of the
firm's riskiness. These stock-price changes constitute the transition cost of reform. Extending
stockholder liability at insured institutions can be interpreted as a risk—rated increase in the
effective insurance premium that is ex post in nature. Impounding the call feature into deposit-
institution stock prices would transfer deposit-insurance subsidies back to the taxpayer and
change incentives for stockholders, managers, and depositors.
Proposals to increase the risk rating in ex ante implicit premiums focus on restructuring
capital requirements. Such proposals have been floated by the big four federal deposit-
institution regulators and have found substantial industry support. To be maximally effective,
risk-rated capital requirements must employ parameters that are based on market valuations of
the net riskiness of deposit-institution positions and must define capital in a market-value sense.
Risk-rated explicit premiums are neither easier nor harder to develop than risk-rated
capital requirements. Ideally, the combination of monitoring costs and premiums of various
kinds would at the margin just exhaust the reduction in institutional financing costs generated by
the federal guarantee. Using covenants to minimize residual incentive incompatibility, private
guarantors use bond-market information to price their services in roughly this way. While useful,
agency proposals to impose different implicit and explicit charges on clients judged to have
"normal" and "above-normal" riskiness can at best only partially establish this condition.
The incentive reforms treated so far address conflicts of interest between insurers and
deposit institutions. To complete the task of reform, it is necessary also to make regulators and
elected politicians more accountable to the taxpayer. This requires making it easier for44
taxpayers to recognize poor regulatory performance by reducing regulatorst power to suppress
information relevant for assessing the quality of agency performance.This end would be
promoted by any or all of four broadly procompetitive programs: (1) requiring market-value
accounting for insurer liabilities; (2) permitting customers and institutions to compare examina-
tion ratings with parallel assessments made by private rating agencies; (3)testingthe pricing of
deposit-insurance coverages for representative samples of institutions in private markets for
reinsurance; and (4) opening up competition for basic coverages between the FDIC and FSLIC and
for supplementary coverages between these institutions and private providers.
How hard agencies and politicians resist each of these changes reflects not only how
difficult it might appear administratively to effect the proposed change in procedures but also
how much improved taxpayer scrutiny would impinge on their freedom of action. Each program
would let taxpayers judge whether government or private regulatory mechanisms were doing (or
could do) a better or worse job of monitoring, pricing, and disciplining deposit-institution risk-
taking. Such information would improve politicians' ability to oversee agency operations and
force them to face up to and to acknowledge the costs of overly bountiful approaches to
insolvency resolution. If making these costs public proves insufficient to avoid inappropriate
bailouts, voters could go so far as to introduce statutory restraints on the extent to which
insurers or the Federal Reserve could advance funds --inthe absence of regional or national
crisis --toan economically insolvent firm.
V. The Current Impasse Is Political Not Economic
Policymakers often claim that economics fails to offer answers to difficult real-world
problems. At least in the case of deposit-insurance reform, the problem for economists is not an
absence of answers, but an absence of convincing research on how to assemble a minimally
disruptive package of effective subsystem reforms.
In the arena of policy research, the predominant problem is the absence of answers that are
politically painless. Society and its elected representatives have a tendency to deny and to cover45
uppainful tensions. Developing the will to confront and resolve hard issues may be regarded as a
higher-order problem that takes precedence over any particular set of substantive issues and
helps to explain the strength of forces tending to maintain the status quo.
The distributional pattern of deposit-insurance costs and benefits create winners and
losers. Underestimating and hiding the costs helps winners to keep losers from banding together
in full force to demand reform. In the case of deposit insurance, the biggest winners are
government officials whose jobs are made easier and high-flying deposit institutions that force
deposit insurers into funding their risky plays at subsidized rates. Foremost among the losers are
those that backstop the insurers: ordinary taxpayers and institutions that compete for business
with these high-flying firms. As the product lines of deposit institutions extend into more and
more activities, aggrieved competitors increasingly include not only well-managed and well-
capitalized deposit institutions, but nondepository firms of various kinds --especiallyinsurance
companies, securities firms, and real-estate companies.
Defects in contemplated information reporting systems and in related closure options stand
out as weak links in reform packages currently being pushed by U.S. authorities. The failure of
industry trade associations to focus criticism on these glaring weaknesses testifies to their
members' short-sighted concern for preserving near-term subsidies even in the face of their
firms' expanding long-run exposure to loss in a deposit-insurance crisis. As long as healthy
institutions hold so myopic a view, political support for meaningful reform in accounting
requirements or insolvency criteria may have to await a crisis.SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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